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Abstract: Intergovernmental transfers from the central level are an important
source of revenue for most subnational governments in developing countries.
This importance is likely to grow even further taking into account the ongoing
decentralization initiatives in Latin America and elsewhere. This paper investi-
gates in a series of regressions whether the transfer mechanisms in place in Ar-2
gentina, Mexico and Brazil satisfy a set of basic propositions: (a) equity princi-
ple: poorer jurisdictions are not treated less favorably than better off ones; (b)
incentive principle: subnational tax effort is encouraged and (c) political nondis-
crimination principle: electoral, partisan or other political constellations play no
role in determining the distribution of transfers. The most striking result is that
politics do seem to matter. In Brazil and Argentina the spatial representation
pattern in congress was the most important determinant of the distribution be-
tween states and provinces. In Mexico, by contrast, a more partisan approach
could be observed. In Mexico and Brazil we can also observe a violation of the
equity principle. The paper concludes that the reform of political and budgetary
institutions must go hand in hand if a rational system of fiscal federalism is to
evolve.
1.      INTRODUCTION
In the United States the federalism controversy peaked more than two centuries
ago.  Then, the authors of the Federalist Papers argued successfully for a division of
responsibilities among jurisdictions and the world’s first federal constitution based on
the principle of subsidiarity. The principles according to which different layers of gov-
ernment coexist side by side as institutions in their own right has not been questioned
by the political mainstream since these days. Interest in federalism and decentralization
flared up much more recently in other parts of the world. In the former soviet block the
disappearance of the firm grip of the central government leads, albeit slowly, to a more
prominent role of subnational jurisdictions. Simultaneously, in the advent of monetary
union and possibly on the road to intensified political unity, the western half of Europe
argues fiercely about the most desirable apportioning of political power between the
Union, the nation states and the regions.
An unlikely candidate for the decentralization spin seems to be Latin America.
Its long tradition of consistent centralization dates back to colonial Spain’s highly cen-
tralist system of imperial administration through the Consejo de las Indias. After inde-
pendence the centralist heritage in Latin America was further intensified in an attempt
to consolidate the young and fragile nations. It was not before the collapse of authori-
tarian and centralist regimes in central and south America that the call for decentraliza-
tion of policy making gained momentum. Today the quest for less centralized and more
participatory political structures belongs to the rhetoric repertoire of politicians of almost
all political colorings. While in some cases this claim appears to be mere lip service and3
only timid steps of deconcentration haven been taken, some countries in Latin America
have already gone a long way in truly devolving substantial powers to local and provin-
cial governments. The recent flood of publications to this former non-topic indicates that
it is a prominent issue that is here to stay well into the next millennium.
1
The most common arguments  in favor  of decentralization refer to  increased
economic efficiency in the provision of local public goods, and increased political par-
ticipation at the local level – in turn considered a precondition for an inclusive deepen-
ing of democratization. I will not discuss the political argument, although its importance
for Latin America is undeniable, being a region struggling with the legacy of elitist politi-
cal dominance and widespread exclusion of indigenous citizens from the political proc-
ess. According to the economic arguments following the seminal paper by  Tiebout
(1956) decentralization allows heterogeneous citizens to choose the tax payment/public
service bundle that resembles their preferences most.  "Thus, subordinated govern-
ments have to compete for factors of production by offering specific sets of public poli-
cies. In this context, only those restrictions will be maintained that imply political bene-
fits which are higher valued by the local and regional population than the associated
economic costs.“
2  Decentralized decision making allows subnational governments to
react according to local preferences about which they might be better informed than the
central level. The closeness of subnational governments to the electorate makes audi-
tory efforts by the latter more feasible, which leads to greater accountability. Decentrali-
zation is thus expected to enhance economic development by reducing waste in the
provision of public services. The link between decentralization and growth is hard to
                                               
1  Some of the more important comprehensive monographs on decentralization issues in Latin America
are, e.g. CEPAL/GTZ (1996), Inter-American Development Bank (1994), Lopez-Murphy (1995), Rivera
(1996), Arellano Cadena (1996) and Nickson (1994).
2Ahrens (1996, p. 20).4
track down empirically, however.
3 Adherents to the public choice school took this argu-
ment one step further and claimed that in a decentralized environment the threat of a
Leviathan state intruding ever more intensively into the economy can be held in check
more easily. Whether the “competition” of jurisdictions in a federation leads to a smaller
public sector than in the unitary “monopolist” case is empirically inconclusive, however.
The results are particularly ambiguous in cases where intergovernmental collusion exist
in the form of fiscal transfers from central government, which can reduce interjurisdic-
tional competition.
4
At the same time the devolution of political power is subject to some risks. The
most serious one, especially for poor countries with a low endowment in human capital
and managerial resources is the lack of administrative capacity on the local level. This
may in some cases lead to deterioration of public service provision and unduly high
administrative costs. Another problematic issue is the fact that while the allocation of
resources may well improve in the course of decentralization, the tasks of stabilization
and distribution surely become more cumbersome. Firstly, this is due to the fact that
inter-regional mobility of citizens is considered much higher than the cross-border one.
The migration response to differing distributional policies are interregionally higher than
in the international context. This can render policies striving for distributional justice by
a subnational jurisdiction self-defeating: the influx of the poor and the exodus of  the
rich destroy the required resource base. Secondly, regions are also more open to trade
than the country as a whole. This leads to large “leakages” of anticyclical fiscal meas-
ures to other jurisdictions. As a result both distributional and stabilization policies suffer
from a prisoners dilemma situation, with each  subnational government rationally
                                               
3Davoodi/Zou (1996) present some pooled regression results indicating that in developing countries a
higher degree of decentralization induces moderately higher growth of GDP. However, once initial per
capita income is introduced as a (significantly negative) explaining variable, the T-values for the decen-
tralization variable nose-dive and the coefficients become insignificant. The following interpretation
seems to be obvious: what we observe is merely the well known convergence of per capita incomes with
poorer countries growing faster than richer ones. The developing region where this was lamentably not
the case recently (Sub-Saharan Africa) is only represented with 3 countries (only about 10% of the de-
veloping countries in the sample). As poorer countries are on average more centralized than richer ones,
the decentralization variable is measuring in fact the starting level of income rather than decentralization.
Accordingly, in the equations where the initial income level was used, the degree of decentralization did
not influence the growth rate. The authors’ disaggregation into countries with three and with two levels of
government is misleading, as for example the classification of Argentina and Mexico as two-level sys-
tems indicates. The differentiating results between two- and three-level countries is therefore precarious
at best.5
speculating on the provision of redistribution and stabilization by other administrations
on the same level. Therefore distribution and stabilization are usually a domain of the
central government which does not suffer from this incentive problem. Decentralization,
however, reduces the resources available to the central administration to address these
national policies.
Another problematic issue that is increasingly attracting attention is the high de-
gree of corruption in Latin America, that may actually worsen with the delegation of
public functions to lower levels of government, which may still be dominated by local
caciques. Some authors conclude that corruptive practices are more common on the
local level as contiguity leads to personalistic decision making.
5 Little evidence exists on
the causal relation, if any, between decentralization and corruption.
6 If the institutional
weakness on lower levels of government would encourage corrupt practices, an im-
portant caveat would have to be made, especially if officials of subnational govern-
ments are less well paid that their counterparts at the national level, which will encour-
age bribery.
7 A related problem is the presence of special intyerest groups that may be
more successful in there rent-seeking activities vis-a-vis local politicians that when fac-
ing central government bureaucrats far away in the nation’s capital. Hettich and Winer
argue convincingly that a priori it is not theoretically clear, whether overall interst group
pressure will increase after decentralization. The degree of interest homogeneity is
likely to be larger in lower level jurisdictions due to prior “voting by feet” in line with Tie-
bout’s model. The collective action theory predicts that homogeneity will create more
lobbying as organization costs decrease. On the other hand, a decentralized system
makes the “exit” option more attractive as a response to policy initiatives that are per-
                                                                                                                               
4 A survey on the literature on decentralization and size of the public sector can be found in Oates (1989).
The role of the transfer system is examined by Grossman (1989) and more recently by Ehdaie (1994).
5 Cf. Tanzi (1995, p. 301).
6 Cf. Pope (1996, p. 45). I ran a simple cross country regression for Latin America using “corruption” as
the dependent variable and the percentage of total public spending by lower levels of government as the
independent variable as a "decentralization" proxy. It produced a positive, but statistically insignificant
relationship. The sample included 11 regional countries. “Corruption” was measured as the percentage
of country stories in the CD-ROM of Latin American Business Information (LABI) by the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit Publications covering 1993-mid1996 that focused on corruption relative to the total number
of stories (which must exceed 50, otherwise the country is excluded). E.g.  23 out of 436 stories on
Venezuela were on corruption, the “Corruption” variable would therefore be 5.3% (=23/436). The more
elaborated Corruption Index by Transparency International  and the University of Göttingen could not be
used as too few Latin American countries are included (http://www.uni-goettingen.de/~uwvw/icr.htm).6
ceived as harmful by individuals or firms. The relatively uncostly movement of assets
reduces the pressure to raise “voice”.  The overall effect of decentralization on rent
seeking activities is therefore highly ambiguous even from the theoretical point of view,
let alone the empirical one.
8
From the practical viewpoint the main problem with fiscal decentralization is the
vertical imbalance of expenditure responsibility and taxation power. Subnational gov-
ernments often do not have sufficient own revenue to finance the decentralized serv-
ices without outside assistance. Tax collection generally remains heavily centralized
due to economies of scale in collection and the fact that taxes that are either redistribu-
tive or suitable for economic stabilization should remain in the hands of the central
government. These taxes usually comprise the lion’s share of total tax revenue (income
tax, VAT etc.). If responsibilities devolve to lower levels of government, a mechanism is
needed that guarantees sufficient funding. Intergovernmental transfers are the main
instrument to secure sufficient resources for all layers of public administration.
The next chapter will discuss the role of intergovernmental transfers. Basic nor-
mative principles are introduced that will allow to judge upon the design of intergovern-
mental fiscal relations. In chapters 3 through 5 empirical tests are presented that inves-
tigate whether the transfer systems in Argentina, Mexico and Brazil work according to
the principles. In chapter six it will be concluded that the principles are more often than
not violated. In particular, in all three countries the transfers to intermediate govern-
ments are influenced by political factors.
2.      THE ROLE OF TRANSFERS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM
Intergovernmental transfers are the dominant source of revenue for most sub-
national governments in developing countries.
9 This holds true also for Latin America.
Table 1 gives an impression of the importance of the transfers in the three countries to
be discussed in detail in the rest of this paper.
                                                                                                                               
7 This differential in remuneration is not uncommon in Latin America. While data on wages in subnational
governments is extremely scant there is evidence that pay increases substantially with the level of gov-
ernment in Belize, Cuba and El Salvador (ILO, 1991).
8 Cf. Hettich/Winer (1987, pp. 44-49).
9 Cf. Shah (1994, p. 24).7
Table 1: Indicators of Decentralization and Intergovernmental Transfers
Argentina Mexico Brazil
























￿CEPAL/GTZ (1996, pp. 93,103), 
￿Arellano Cadena (1996, p.123) and 
￿IMF
(1995). In the Mexican figures the federal district is not included.
The first line shows the degree to which the responsibilities for public spending
have been decentralized in the three big federal states in Latin America. In Brazil two
thirds of all public expenditure is undertaken by the states and municipalities, whereas
Mexico remains a very centralized state.
10 While the second line gives an impression of
the important weight of transfers from the central to the intermediate level of govern-
ment, exceeding 5% of GNP in both Argentina and Brazil. The last line indicates the
dependence of subnational governments from this source. In Argentina and Mexico,
where the reliance has decreased somewhat in recent years, transfers account for
more than half of the revenue of the intermediate governments. Brazilian States show a
higher  degree of tax autonomy but still depend by about a third from funds by the cen-
tral government. The current decentralization efforts underway in Latin America are
likely to add to the prominence of transfers, as almost all strategies envisage enhanced
flows from the central government.
11
With intergovernmental transfers firmly established in Latin America’s federa-
tions and likely to gain further in importance, it is crucial to establish some normative
framework on which to judge the practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations. It is not
the aim of this paper to describe the sometimes very complex structure of the intergov-
                                               
10 Mexico is in the process of moving slowly in the direction of becoming a more decentralized country,
however. The late 1970s were characterized by a federal government absorbing over 90% of total public
spending. Cf. Pineda Pablos (1994, Anexo).
11 Cf. CEPAL/GTZ (1996, p. 51, Cuadro I.1).8
ernmental transfer systems presently in use. Instead a much more modest goal is pur-
sued. It is not considering what  is  the structure of intergovernmental transfers, but
rather what it should look like. Within this line of reasoning a few basic propositions are
made. The focus is narrowed further in the sense that we want to scrutinize only the
secondary distribution, i.e. how the funds that are transferred from the central to the
intermediate governments are distributed among the latter. The primary distribution, i.e.
what percentage of central government revenue is shared with the states or provinces
in the first place, will not be discussed. In the following chapters on Argentina, Mexico
and Brazil an empirical investigation checks to what extent the practice of fiscal rela-
tions between central and intermediate governments adhere to the normative demands.
Three propositions are established as yardsticks by which to measure the rationality of
the secondary distribution of the transfer system.
1. Equity Principle. Distributional policy can only be effective if implemented by
the central level. As the living conditions are, among other things, often correlated with
geographical location, an active measure of redistributive policy could consist of chan-
neling more per capita transfers into regions with poor socio-economic indicators. A
weak interpretation of this principle would demand only that poorer regions should not
receive less funds than richer ones. The stronger interpretation would demand that,
other things being equal, governments of poor regions should not only receive at least
the same per capita transfers, but that they should actually obtain relatively higher
funding in order to foster equalization of living conditions across the nation.
2. Incentive Principle. Since transfers are quantitatively so crucial for the lower
levels of government, a defective design of the secondary distribution formula can lead
to serious distortions of incentives. This may be the case if the higher level of govern-
ment is systematically increasing its transfers to states with fragile fiscal positions. The
precarious fiscal situation may be due to either a poor tax base (e.g. of poorer prov-
inces or states) or to a low effort of raising taxes on behalf of the intermediate govern-
ment, although the tax base is comparable to that of other states. Perverse incentives
can discourage a subsidiary tax effort if bailout transfers of the central government can
be expected. To prevent this from happening the per capita transfers from central gov-
ernment should – other things (e.g. regional economic development level) being equal
– not increase with lower tax ratios of the intermediate government. This, again, is the9
weak interpretation. The strong interpretation of this proposition goes one step further.
Central government should create incentives for higher tax efforts and per capita
transfers should decrease with lower tax ratios of intermediate governments – again
controlling for differences in the level of development and hence tax bases. This design
would encourage intensified decentralization and subsidiarity as the relative importance
of transfers would gradually shrink in the subnational governments' budgets.
3. Political Nondiscrimination Principle. In a nutshell this proposition postu-
lates that electoral, partisan or other political constellations should play absolutely no
role in the determination of the secondary distribution. In cases where the distribution is
following a nondiscretionary formula, this should always be the case. But even then it
remains an open question whether the practice will fully follow the legal norms, which is
frequently not the case.
12 As long as there is de facto discretionality by the central gov-
ernment the temptation of abusing the transfer system to promote partisan or individual
political goals remains. This political tinkering is not compatible with a rational and fair
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
The presented propositions, especially the weak formulations, are probably un-
controversial and can easily be endorsed from a normative point of view. The analysis
of the three country studies that follow now will prove, on the other hand, that even
these minimal standards are frequently unmet and violations of all three principles oc-
cur.
3.    ARGENTINA
3.1.   The political institutions
During the first decade following the military withdrawal from power, the political
system was dominated by two major parties, the Radical Party (UCR) and the Peronists
(JU). Both parties had a strong tradition dating back well before the consecutive re-
pressive military governments. Since 1982 elected governors of the provinces usually
belonged to either of the two parties and their presidential candidates received more
than a combined 90% (80%) of the vote in 1983 and 1989. Only in the mid 1990s, a10
new political force, Frepaso (Frente País Solidario), became a serious contender in
electoral races. Party politics and political brawl along party lines are clearly a salient
feature in the Argentinean political environment. However, the interests of individual
provinces are also alert and congregate in parliament as coalitions across party lines.
Argentina has a bicameral system with the 46 Senators being named directly by
provincial legislatures, which can send two each, and the 254 Deputies being popularly
elected, with proportional representation being applied within each province.
13 Despite
an “orderly” party system that has been characterized by the traditional Radical-
Peronist duopoly until 1995, ideological cohesion within the parties is not that strong as
to guarantee humble following of the party leadership’s voting recommendation. Fac-
tionalism has been particularly notorious within the Peronist movement.
14 Pork barrel
projects favoring particular municipalities or provinces can secure parliamentary majori-
ties in the same way as this happens in many western-style legislations. Argentinean
congressmen doubtlessly fight not only for national goals according to their ideological
preferences, but are also inclined to do their utmost to support their constituencies back
home in the provinces. Lawmakers have to be mindful that their personal political future
is depending to a large extent on how the electorate in their provincial districts fare.
Their interest in the regional distribution of federal funds is therefore a genuine one.
Accordingly, congressmen are reported to “spend most of their time back in their prov-
inces; or, when in Buenos Aires, they devote themselves almost entirely to lobbying
bureaucrats on behalf of individuals and their provincial governments.”
15 This is even
more understandable in the light of a powerful presidency that repeatedly decrees leg-
islation on national issues, which reduces the congress members' influence in decisions
concerning nationwide affairs.
If provinces were equally represented and all lawmakers had the same “produc-
tivity” in terms of securing benefits for the eligible voters in their locality, the overall ef-
fect of distribution of federal funds should be zero, as the efforts would cancel each
other out in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Reality, however, is different. Whereas the
hypothesis seems acceptable, that all Deputies and Senators are equally talented in
                                                                                                                               
12  Cf.  World Bank (1995, p. 41).
13 For details of the electoral rules cf. Nohlen (1993, p. 34-36)
14 Cf. Wynia (1995, p. 81).
15 Wynia (1995, p. 79-80).11
rent seeking activities, the assumption of equal representation of each voter, irrespec-
tive of his province of origin, is clearly false. For example, a Senator of the province of
Buenos Aires represents 60 times as many voters as her colleague from Santa Cruz.
This is the result of the fact, that each province sends two Senators, irrespective of the
number of residents. While the number of Deputies in Argentina’s lower chamber in-
creases with the provincial population, it does not do so proportionately. This results in
a “representation intensity” pattern of Deputies that is similarly biased in favor of less
populous states. Indeed, Deputies per voter and Senators per voter are highly corre-
lated  across provinces with a coefficient of 0.99. As time and resource restrictions that
limit political interest peddling are about equal for all legislators, voters in less populous
provinces can count on higher per capita lobbying by “their” parliamentary delegation. A
non-negative lobbying productivity of each lawmaker – a trivial assumption indeed – will
then lead to higher material benefits per capita accruing to “over-represented” prov-
inces.
The most striking feature of Argentinean democracy, however, has not been the
partisan stability or the provincial struggle over the distribution of the pie, but the very
personalistic, presidential regime.
16 The Radical president, Raúl Alfonsín, and his Pero-
nist successor Carlos Menem possibly even more so, ruled liberally by decree. The
formal system of checks and balances was therefore weakened as parliamentary
authority was undermined. Lawmaking by decrees was usually justified with constitu-
tional emergency provisions that call for a strong executive in times of “crises”.
17 The
personalistic style of governing culminated in the successful bid by President Menem to
change the constitution in order to allow reelection.  Freedom House, a US based
watchdog evaluating political and civil freedom in the world considered downgrading
Argentina in 1996 due to “mounting evidence of systemic government corruption and
authoritarian behavior by the country’s president.”
18 It is important to note, however,
that it appears to be the explicit preference of the electorate to bring strong politicians
into executive office. In a 1988 public opinion poll more than two thirds of the interview-
ees supporting Menem did so not in spite of but because he was considered to be
                                               
16 Cf. Wynia (1995, p. 73).
17 Cf. Wynia (1995, p. 75).
18 Freedom House (1996).12
“popular/a caudillo.”
19 The presidency is a particularly powerful institution in the Argen-
tinean political landscape that is not effectively confined to the limits of the constitution-
ally assigned powers.
3.2.   Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
20
Over 80% of the transfers from central to provincial governments follow an
automatic allocation by well defined rules (most notably the tax sharing agreements
between the national and the provincial governments, or “coparticipación”). The formu-
las that have been in use in the past to allocate disbursements among provinces dif-
fered from one transfer program to another, usually including population size, per cap-
ita income, density and provincial fiscal conditions. When the old coparticipation system
was unable to come forward with the necessary resources for the provinces and ad hoc
contributions by the Treasury had to fill the widening gaps, the revenue sharing system
was dissolved altogether in 1984. The years following the breakdown of the old formula
were characterized by “anarchy”
21: temporary and purely discretionary bilateral transfer
deals between the federal government and the provinces replaced objective rules. In
the complete absence of explicit tax sharing rules all vertical transfers were distributed
in the form of Treasury support.
22 In 1988, however, the secondary distribution among
provinces that resulted from this spontaneous bargaining process was fixed by law
without further justification, thus perpetuating the pattern that emerged during the
ruleless period 1985-87, which is likely to have furthered provinces that have shown
less fiscal prudence and that were bailed out during those years.
23 The present system
has been criticized as “completely arbitrary, and indefensible from any public policy
perspective.”
24
About 4% of total transfers in 1995 were of the completely discretionary Treas-
ury Grants (Apoyos de Tesoro Nacional – ATN).
25 ATNs provide unconditional aid to
                                               
19 Cf. Arias (1995, Table 1).
20 A good introductory source to the technical aspects of the complex Argentinean transfer system is World
Bank (1996, Vol. 1, pp. 31-41) or – more compact – Fernandez (1995, pp. 200-203).
21 CEPAL/GTZ (1996, p. 54).
22 Cf. Artana et al. (1995, p. 84-90) and Liuksila/Schwartz (1996, p. 15-17).
23 Cf. Porto/Sanguinetti (1993, Anexo II.A). The provincial shares as fixed in Law 23.548 are documented
in the same source on p. 79, Cuadro 23.
24 Cf. World Bank (1996, Vol. 2, p. 30).
25 Cf. World Bank (1996, Vol. 1, Table 3.3 and Appendix, Table 15).13
provincial governments in fiscal trouble with the allocation of funds being fixed freely by
the Ministry of the Interior. The share of provincial revenues coming from ATN transfers
has grown by an annual average of 30% between 1991 and 1995, accounting for 2.3%
of total provincial revenues in 1995. While this may be considered as negligible and
therefore not worth a distinct analysis, the ATN transfers are of substantially higher fis-
cal importance for some selected provinces. Some provinces are fiscally more depend-
ent on this type of transfer as this aggregate figure suggests, a fact that is highlighted
by the extreme case of La Rioja, where over 40% of the government’s resources origi-
nate from ATNs.
26 It is true that the prominence of discretionary transfers has been
much more pronounced in the 1970s and most of the 1980s. However, the statement
of an Argentinean Economics Ministry official saying that their recent quantitative rele-
vance for the provinces as a group is negilgible
27, must be interpreted with some cau-
tion, as this may be wrong for some provinces. In addition, there have been other dis-
cretionary transfers, for instance in the form of advances of future non-discretionary
coparticipation flows.
28
3.3.   Empirical Evidence
This section investigates to what extend the Argentinean intergovernmental
transfer system worked in accordance with the principles postulated in chapter 2. The
empirical approach consists of multiple regressions using OLS estimation. The equa-
tions of the cross-province regressions are summarized in Table 2.
The empirical analysis is conducted for two years representing distinct stages in
the process of the Argentinean democratic transition. The first year is 1986, when the
first democratic administration of President Alfonsín of the Radical party was in power.
As explained above, in 1986 the Argentinean tax-sharing system (“coparticipación”)
was very distinctive as there were no explicit rules whatsoever concerning secondary
distribution. The second year examined is 1995, the latest year for which data is avail-
                                               
26 Cf. World Bank (1996, Vol. 1, Statistical Appendix, Table 7). There are other important de facto “grants”
like the National Housing Fund (FONAVI) that are not investigated in this paper. While FONAVI re-
sources have to be paid back in principle, the income recovered from outstanding housing loans has
only been between 2% and 4% in 1978-1993. Cf. World Bank (1993, p. 128).
27 “…las transferencial discretionales … no tienen ninguna relevancia cuantitativa a nivel del consolidado
de provinias…” Fernandez (1995, p. 199).
28 Cf. Liuksila/Schwartz (1996, p. 15, Footnote 9 and p. 20).14
able. Under the peronist government of Carlos Menem democracy had been fully es-
tablished but had started to take a turn towards a more personalistic style of governing
on behalf of what one political observer called the “caudillo riojano”
29, symbolized by
the previously inconceivable reelection of the incumbent. In 1995 the basic secondary
distribution device were the rigid shares, that had been fixed in 1988.
The sample comprises 23 provinces, excluding Tierra del Fuego that did not
enjoy the status of a province but was treated as a federal territory in 1986. In order to
avoid statistical disturbances originating from the expansion of the sample and to
maintain comparability of results, Tierra del Fuego has been omitted in the 1995 re-
gressions.
Except for the dummies, all  variables are standardized,  having a cross-
provincial arithmetic mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity. Thus a provincial
value of, say, -0.5 indicates that the province’s value lies half a standard deviation be-
low the inter-provincial mean. As both dependent and independent variables are de-
fined in this way, the regression coefficients can be interpreted as “elasticities”.
They display the change in the dependent variable (in multiples of standard deviations
from the mean) if the independent variable is exogeneously increased by one standard
deviation.
The most comprehensive dependent variable is the per capita transfer of all
funds from the federal to the provincial governments (TOTALTRANSFER). AUTO-
MATICTRANSFER comprises only the formula-based segments of transferred funds
per capita, whereas ATNTRANSFER represents the discretionary ATNs.
The first independent variable is HDI, an index of human development. It in-
corporates with equal weights a health indicator (life expectancy at birth), an educa-
tional indicator (average years of schooling) and an income indicator (GNP per capita
at purchasing power parity). Basic educational and – to a lesser degree – health serv-
ices are policy areas that have been assigned to provincial governments by the consti-
tution.
30 Low attainment levels in these areas (and thus a low indicator value) point out
the need to expand services in the social sectors. At the same time, depressed per
                                               
29 Arias (1995).15
capita incomes imply a comparatively modest tax base. The provincial government is
therefore facing great difficulties in financing the needed social investments. Therefore
HDI also includes an indication of capacity of a provincial government. If anything, in-
creased transfers from the central government to states with low values of HDI should
be expected. Thus a transfer system targeted to mitigate regional inequalities would
require a negative sign of the coefficient. Until 1984 this equalization goal was made
explicit in the tax sharing formula that regulated that, ceteris paribus, underdeveloped
regions were to receive higher transfers.
31
The equations in Table 2 show that this has not been the case in Argentina,
which shows a striking lack of redistributive vigor. Poorer provinces did  not  receive
higher per capita transfers in either year. Indeed, in 1986 higher development and
higher transfers went hand in hand with a probability of 80%. While the coefficients are
not significant and also rather small, the change in sign moving from 1986 (equation
A1) to 1995 (equation A2) indicates that the less “spontaneous” fixed-share approach
of secondary distribution applied since 1988 has not done any additional harm to the
goal of national redistribution. The overall result however, lends support to the finding
of the World Bank that has found that “the correlation between per capita transfers and
social and economic indicators is practically zero.”
32 It must also be kept in mind that
even when a positive relationship between transfers and regional welfare indicators
had been detected, this would not necessarily have translated automatically into an im-
provement of the personal income distribution.
Table 2: Determinants of the regional distribution of federal transfers to
provincial governments in Argentina, 1986 and 1995
A1 A2 A3 A4
          Dependent













                                                                                                                               
30 Cf. Artana et al. (1995, p. 64-66).
31 Cf. Liuksila/Schwartz (1996, p. 17). Housing quality, the number of cars per inhabitant and the average
level of education per inhabitant were used as proxies for the level of development. 25% of shared taxes
were to be distributed by this criteria.
32 Cf. World Bank (1996, Vol. 1, p. 36). A similar conclusion has been drawn by Artana et al. (1995. p. 98)
after having run a non-reported regression: the percentage of households of a province with unmet basic
needs did not significantly influence the per capita transfers in the federal revenue sharing system.16
HDI .17 -.09 -.09 .12
(1.38) -(.68) -(.90) (1.49)
TAXEFFORT .10 .10 .06 .02
(1.19) (.75) (.61) (.31)
DENSITY .06 -.14 -.07 .11
(.40) (-.82) -(.55) (1.03)
UCR 1983 -.08
-(.59)
JU 1989 .14 .10 .11
(1.00) (1.00) (1.30)
SENADORES .95 .66 .88 .29
(5.82) (3.80) (6.97) (2.80)
CAPITAL -.48 -.30 -.41 -.37
-(1.02) -(.54) -(1.03) -(1.13)
LARIOJA -.34 .68 -.74 3.74
-(.85) (1.13) -(1.68) (10.43)
 BUENOSAIRES -.19 -.08 -.01 -.29
-(.46) -(.17) -(.04) -(1.02)
R2 adj. .80 .75 .84 .87
F-Value 18.6 13.1 26.2 40.6
Sample size 23 23 23 23
Note: The values in parentheses are t-statistics. The shaded coefficient are significant at a level of 90% or
more. All F-values are above the critical values. For sources and definitions cf. appendix 1.
Similarly inconclusive results are found for TAXEFFORT and DENSITY.
TAXEFFORT is defined as the ratio of the province’s own revenue (excluding transfers
from the central government) and the respective gross provincial product. The latter is
used as a proxy for the provincial tax base. The variable refers to the year preceding
the year analyzed, i.e. 1985 in equation A1 and 1994 for A2 through A4. The lag is in-
tended to allow TAXEFFORT to represent a year that is most likely to be used as a
benchmark for determining the distribution of transfers in the year under consideration.
If the system is to encourage fiscal effort, it can only do so as a reaction to provincial
fiscal accounts of the preceding year due to reporting lags on behalf of the provincial
treasuries. If the subsidiarity principle is promoted, i.e. if the full exploitation of fiscal
capacity on behalf of the provincial governments were rewarded, than the coefficient
would be positive. While it is laudable that the coefficient is at least not negative (which
would signify that the fiscal managers in the provinces would face incentives for fiscal
recklessness) there is no carrot-and-stick automatism working in favor of provincial
revenue raising efforts either. This result is found in both years. Consequently no in-17
centives have been incorporated in the routine fiscal intergovernmental relations that
would reward lower levels of government that utilize their tax base efficiently.
DENSITY is the rank of a province, ascending with increasing population den-
sity. “Low density” is an official classification of provinces in Argentina, implying that the
corresponding provinces merit special treatment, as the cost of the provision of public
services increases with a more dispersed population. The negligible coefficients and
significance levels come as a surprise. In the tax-sharing formula in use from 1973
through 1984 demographic dispersion was even en explicit argument, albeit with a low
weight of 10%.
33  The 1986 equation (A1) shows even the wrong sign, therefore af-
fecting low density provinces – if at all – adversely! One very important caveat has to
be kept in mind, however: as DENSITY and SENADORES, the highly significant “repre-
sentation intensity” variable to be discussed next are negatively correlated, the low co-
efficient for DENSITY does not necessarily mean that low density provinces did not get
more per capita transfers. What it does mean, however, that they did not get a better
deal because of the fact their dispersed population, but because of the fact that they
usually tended to enjoy stronger representation in Congress.
34
A first preliminary result is obvious. The factors that are usually discussed in the
theoretical literature of fiscal federalism and which should be the driving force behind
the allocation mechanism, do not play a prominent role in Argentina. While this is dis-
appointing, still less enchanting is to come.
 As outlined above, when investigating the political determinants of transfers, we
will have to keep in mind provincial differentials in partisan strength as well as in con-
gressional representation. Last, but by no means least, the potential impact of the
presidency in determining federal funds flowing to the provinces must be considered.
The three political spheres (parties, congress, presidency) will now be discussed in
turn.
                                               
33 Cf. Artana et al. (1995, Fn. 28) and Porto/Sanguinetti (1993, p. 34).
34 This is easy to show. If A1 is modified and either DENSITY or SENADORES are used (as is advisable in
case of the high negative correlation of -.83), the R² adj. for the equation using only DENSITY is .53,
using SENADORES instead, it stands considerably higher at .81. In addition, it is noteworthy that the
statistical significance of the coefficient for SENADORES is larger (T-value = 8.94) than the one for
DENSITY (T-value = -3.71). The political variable clearly overshadows the population density aspect.18
The remaining variables are all of a political nature. The first question that may
come to the mind of the political analyst is whether the party in power may have (ab-)
used it in order to advance the prosperity of those regions, where their support bases
can be found. The evidence does not suggest that this strategy was pursued by either
the Radicals in 1986 or the Peronists in 1995. Indeed, if anything, the Alfonsín govern-
ment was out in an attempt to win over the opposition strongholds and “bribe” the re-
calcitrant states by allocating, ceteris paribus, higher per capita transfers to the prov-
inces where the UCR did badly in the 1983 presidential elections. The elasticity of re-
ceived per capita transfers in 1986 with respect to Alfonsín’s electoral share in 1983 is
very small   (-.08) and insignificant (cf. Variable UCR1983 in equation A2).  Similarly, no
clear party-political manipulation of the transfer allocation could be observed in 1995,
as the insignificant coefficient of JU1989 in equation A5 proves. However, as the sign
is positive with a probability of two thirds, this might at least nourish the suspicion that
the Peronists were more prone to aid their strongholds that the Radicals were.
35
How does the unequal representation effect the distribution of federal transfers?
The empirical results presented here suggest that they are very decisive, thus echoing
results of prior investigators.
36 The standardized variable SENADORES denotes the
number of Senators per million provincial voter. Comparing A1 and A2 it becomes im-
mediately clear, that the intergovernmental transfers in both years have been domi-
nated by this political variable. In 1986 the elasticity (and significance level) has been
even higher, indicating that the congressional members did successfully exploit the era
of anarchic bilateral deals with the federal government in order to promote their own
provinces’ fiscal conditions. In 1986 (1995) an overrepresentation of one standard de-
viation above the average representation intensity led to per capita transfers approxi-
mately one (.66) standard deviations higher than the national average. Figure 1 shows
the tight relationship between representation intensity and per capita transfers in both
years. Due to the symmetry of regional representation in both houses of congress a
regression using the number of deputies per million voters provides corresponding re-
sults.
                                               
35 Alternative party political variable, e.g. the difference between the percentages of the ruling and the
combined (or main) opposition parties or dummies for absolute majorities and the like did not generate
“better” results in the sense that T-values were not systematically higher than for UCR1983 or JU1989.
36 Cf. Sanguinetti (1993, p.87-109) and Porto/ Sanguinetti (1996).19
Figure 1:
Parliamentary Representation and Intergovernmental Transfers, Argentina
But if the provinces with legislative overrepresentation can be successful in ne-
gotiating higher per capita transfers, what could possibly stand in the way of the still
more powerful chief of the executive branch enriching his native province? This addi-
tional political aspect is incorporated by adding a dummy variable that equals one in the
case of the native province of the president and zero otherwise. Whereas Carlos Me-
nem was born in the province of La Rioja, where he also started his political career and
was elected governor three times, Raúl Alfonsín was from the province of Buenos Ai-
res.
37 The equations are thus using the dummy variables BUENOSAIRES and
LARIOJA that are equal to one in the case of the respective province and zero other-
wise.
38
The variable  BUENOSAIRES  is statistically insignificant and negative in A1,
which suggests that Alfonsín did not abuse his power to push for a favorable deal for
his home province. The picture looks slightly different in more recent times. In 1995 the
                                               
37 Cf. The International Who’s Who 1990-91(1990) and Corke (1993).
38 A dummy variable CAPITAL is in addition used to take into account, that the economic and financial
structure of the capital is very different as is the political process of self-determination. It can also be in-
terpreted as a political variable measuring phenomena like metropolitan bias.20
variable LARIOJA shows a high positive coefficients at the admittedly low 73% level of
significance (equation A2). It is interesting to note that while the statistical evidence on
executive bias is very vague indeed, the coefficient for La Rioja changes sign and in-
creases by more than unity in absolute terms. While this is a disquieting result, it is not
robust enough to draw any conclusions on the actual interference on behalf of Presi-
dent Menem in favor of La Rioja.
The picture becomes less hazy if the total transfers in 1995 are broken down
into different parts, one that is easily manipulated and another one that is following a
preset formula of secondary distribution. The latter one we shall call “automatic trans-
fers”. The regression in equations A3 resembles equation A2, but uses AUTOMATIC-
TRANSFER as the dependent variable, representing the formula-derived transfers only.
Two results concerning the political economy view are noteworthy. The first
memorable fact is that the variable SENADORES increases both in size and signifi-
cance if compared to equation A2, which used not only the “automatic” transfers, but
the total of transfers, i.e. also the part that is discretional. This could be interpreted as
suggesting that the bias in favor of over-represented provinces has been institutional-
ized and has become an integral part of the formula used for distributing funds. In 1988
the legal changes described above fixed the secondary distribution that had evolved
from the discretionary bilateral bargaining between federal and provincial governments.
Therefore the negotiation advantages of the over-represented provinces that had been
exploited in the interim period were petrified and perpetuated until the very day. Thus
the legislators do not need to fight anew year by year for the fiscal privileges of their
constituencies, but can rely on the formula in use, the design of which has been biased
in favor of the over-represented states. The second remarkable result is the complete
absence of any positive influence of the dummy La Rioja, which turns actually negative
with a probability of 89%. This may be due to the fact that the distributive formula has
been set before Menem became president. Whereas the members of the legislation
can thus partly rely on the revenue-sharing formula for distributing pork, the president
has to build on the discretionary part if he or she desires to exercise provincial patron-
age. “Executive” favors are hence less rule-bound and therefore less stable as the par-
allel layer of cronyism originating in congress.21
This preliminary conclusion is supported by the evidence of equation A4. It
identifies the distributional determinants of the most discretionary transfers, the non-
reimbursable ATN-grants. ATNTRANSFER is the standardized dependent variable in
equation A4. The coefficient and its significance level of the LARIOJA variable is ex-
traordinarily high, which could indicate the possible presence of presidential discretion
when it comes to distributing non-reimbursable ATN support. Actually, when the re-
gression is run using the dummy LARIOJA as the only independent variable the ad-
justed R² reached 0.84. The explanatory powers of the much more comprehensive
equation M4 is only minimally higher! Besides the dominant impact of LARIOJA, and
hence the suspected decisive influence of the executive branch, the legislators suc-
ceeded once more in reaping some additional benefits for their constituencies in this
discretionary type of transfers, although the coefficients are about two thirds lower
compared to equation A3.
39
The “division of labor” in terms of regional support thus seems to provide the
presidency with the geographically highly unequal instrument of discretionary ATNs
(inter provincial variation coefficient in 1995 = 2.3) whereas the over-represented mem-
bers of Congress collude to secure the somewhat more equally distributed automatic
and rules-based federal transfers (inter provincial variation coefficient in 1995 = 0.52).
40
3.4.   Conclusions
n  Both the equity and incentive principles hold in their respective weak interpreta-
tions in both years examined. The payments are unrelated to the level of both pro-
vincial development or revenue raising efforts. If using the strong interpretation of
both principles they are both violated: no positive relationship exists between de-
velopment and tax effort on one hand and transfer receipts on the other. The inter-
governmental fiscal relations are therefore in their present shape ill-suited to con-
                                               
39 This finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence: “Many homes in La Rioja province, one of the coun-
try’s poorest, still have no electricity or potable water. But Anillaco - Mr. Menem’s hometown [800 in-
habitants] - boasts paved roads, a modern hospital, an almost completed $3 million scientific center and
two comfortable hotels despite having few tourists. Later this month, a 1.2-mile runway for Mr. Menem
to land his personal jet [...] should be completed.” The Washington Times, (March 4, 1997).
40 A separate set of regressions for all discretionary transfers from central government has been under-
taken, but is not reported here. The political economy results are comparable when it comes to the
privileged status of La Rioja, whereas the coefficient of SENADORES was also positive, albeit insignifi-
cantly so.22
tribute actively to the national challenges of sharing the development process more
equitably or encouraging fiscal subsidiarity.
n  The political nondiscriminatory principle has been violated in 1986 and 1995.
While it can be stated that partisan interests did not significantly determine the dis-
tribution of transfers, other political factors did:
1.  Discretionary transfers are prone to be hijacked by political interests (equation A4).
The apparent favoring of the president’s home province is a recent phenomenon,
that could not be traced back to the Alfonsín government. Three interpretations are
possible: one is that Alfonsín was more reluctant to use his power than Menem with
the second being that his ties with the province of Buenos Aires were possibly
weaker than Menem’s with La Rioja, as he left for the (near-by) capital earlier in his
life. Thirdly, given the sheer population size of Buenos Aires province, in order to
make a comparable impact for its citizens, it would take a multiple of resources to
be transferred in absolute terms compared to what is necessary to favor the much
smaller population of La Rioja.
2.  Equation A3 has shown that even rules-based revenue-sharing systems are not
immune against the penetration of political interest into the scheme. In the Argen-
tinean case the differences in representation in congress had strong repercussions
on the per-capita allocation of non-discretionary transfers.
4.   MEXICO
„Leaders of the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party, or PRD, have charged, that
the PRI has used government funds illicitly to boost its chance of victory. The state govern-
ment, which recently received a 25% boost in federal funds, has launched a campaign to
spruce up roads and monuments around the state.”
The Wall Street Journal, (Oct. 4, 1996)
on the municipal elections in Guerrero, Mexico.
4.1.   The political institutions
Few political systems in Latin America have been scrutinized as intensively and
controversially as the Mexican one. This fascination stems at least partly from the in-
stitutional stability that would have been unimaginable in other Latin American countries
and that made the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) the longest ruling23
party on the globe. While ideology and policies have been quite volatile in Mexico,
these changes took place within a closed corporatist framework that prevented a return
of porfirian presidentialism and soviet-style gerontocracy by obeying scrupulously the
constitutional ban on reelection. The resulting high turnover of political elites allowed
the system to react flexibly to changing political or economic challenges without having
to modify partisan institutions. Real electoral competition took place only within the up-
per echelons of the ruling party. PRI candidates for governorships or president were
eventually elected to the office they were running for. Not before the highly contested
presidential ballot in 1988 and the PRI losing its first gubernatorial race in 1989, when
the PAN (Partido de Acción Nacional) candidate overtook the “official” one in Baja
California, some genuine interparty competition occurred. The third significant player is
the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) that was created in the late 1980s by
left leaning politicians defecting the more and more technocratic PRI. Until this day the
PRI succeeded to hang on to its dominant position despite the loss of a handful of lost
gubernatorial elections to the PAN, that can draw on heavy support in the more indus-
trialized northern states.
Like Argentina, Mexico has a bicameral system that resembles the U.S. Con-
gress, with two (since 1994: four) Senators being elected by direct popular vote in each
of the 31 federal states plus the Federal District, where Mexico City is located.
41 The
Deputies in the lower chamber are also elected by the population and their number per
state augments in proportion with the state’s population. In stark contrast to the U.S.
system there exists a prohibition of consecutive reelection for members of both cham-
bers. Besides, 200 out of the currently 500 Deputies in the lower house are elected by
party lists in proportional representation. The large districts comprising several states
each that do not necessarily need to be in the same region. Until today the PRI main-
tained the majority of representatives in both chambers. But in 1988 it lost its two thirds
majority in the House of Deputies needed to change the constitution. As the PRI always
fares better in uninominal than in at-large districts, its majority in the Senate has lin-
gered around a very solid 95% until the mid 1990s.
42
                                               
41 A good introduction into the political system in Mexico is Camp (1994). Cf. also Kraemer (1997, Chapter
4).
42 Even in the Senate the opposition could secure ¼ of all seats in 1994. Electoral data and rules can be
found in Nohlen (1993, pp. 537-569). For data on the 1994 election cf. U.S. State Department (1996).24
The legislature has traditionally been an extraordinarily weak institution and
proved unable to effectively check the powerful executive branch. Three reasons can
be identified for this phenomenon.
43 First, as the PRI has dominated both chambers, as
the PRI’s leader has always been the incumbent president and as almost every single
piece of legislation is introduced by this very president, deviant voting by PRI legislators
was virtually unheard of. Second, reinforcing strong party discipline is the fact that con-
gress members are not allowed to run a second consecutive term and therefore cannot
develop name recognition, a strong constituent base or policy expertise. Reelection
after pausing one term has been very rare with only one out of seven Deputies return-
ing to congress.  Thirdly, the bicameral Permanent Committee functions when both
houses are in recess. It includes PRI members only and uses its exhaustive constitu-
tional authority (Art. 78-79) to effectively substitute Congress – often for more than six
months!
As a result of the reasons mentioned above, being a member of Congress does
not carry much prestige and holding office in the Mexican legislation does rarely lead to
a powerful political career in either the party or the national administration.
44 Sometimes
a political future may lie ahead in the government of the states the politician is repre-
senting as a lawmaker, which might make her somewhat more amenable to channel
local demands into the legislative process. However, the most talented politicians prefer
to circumvent the congressional detour and instead try to enter the federal executive
branch as tecnócratas: “The Senate in particular became a museum for political has-
beens, a reward to those at the end of their careers or currently out of favor for a top
executive post.”
45
The presidency in Mexico, on the other hand, probably commands comprehen-
sive powers second to no other chief executive in Latin America – a region rightly fa-
mous for prominent presidential authority. In stark contrast to the U.S. political system
no primaries of any sort have shaped the political landscape of Mexico. The president
does not only hand-pick his own successor – the famous dedazo that the current in-
                                               
43 Cf. Lujambio (1996) and Camp (1994, pp. 22-25).
44 This situation may change in the aftermath of the 1996 National Assembly of the PRI, where members
decided against the will of the party’s leadership, that in future presidential nominees would be required
of having experience in an elective office, a condition none of the presidents since 1970 would have ful-
filled.25
cumbent Zedillo seems to be prepared to discontinue – but as head of the party he also
nominates the PRI’s candidates for gubernatorial and congressional races. This top-
down nomination procedure also works in reverse as the president oversees the power
to unseat elected governors that turn troublesome for the president.
46 This lingering
threat of being supplanted discourages autonomous action on behalf of lower echelons
of government. Holders of elective office that have been elected on the PRI ticket grasp
quite well that they are not only (perhaps not even primarily) accountable to the citizens
they represent, but also to the party leadership and in particular, the president.
The close interdependence of party and government makes a clear distinction
between the two next to impossible. The party is said to have drawn heavily on gov-
ernment funds and infrastructure to finance its campaign efforts, while at the same time
it has very little programmatic autonomy vis-à-vis the presidency. Therefore it is not in-
conceivable that a PRI chief executive – facing impending doom to the prevailing
hegemonic regime – would try to make use of the almost absolute power and lack of
effective checks and balances in order to defend the political status-quo. Section 4.3
will investigate whether the fiscal transfers to state governments (which are described
in the section 4.2) could have been a victim of such an attempt to politicize economic
policy making.
4.2.   Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
Before turning to the empirical analysis a few words about the Mexican fiscal
transfer system are in order.
47 As it was already noted, Mexico is one of the most cen-
tralized nations of Latin America despite its formal organization as a federation. The
constitutional article 73(XXIX) lists the limited number of taxes that can be levied exclu-
sively by the federal government. It does not include the rich tax bases like income or
value added. Keeping in mind the subsidiarity principle laid down in article 124, all other
taxes should fall under the states’ jurisdictions. However, article 73(VII) states in addi-
                                                                                                                               
45 Camp (1994, p. 23).
46 “Even popularly elected state governors who fall badly out of favor with the president are faced with al-
most instant dismissal, which the president can accomplish in a variety of ways. He can appoint the
governor to a lesser, non-elective position or force him into retirement. Should the offending governor
resist, the president can have the PRI controlled federal Senate declare the state government “dis-
solved”.” Cornelius/Craig (1991, p. 33).26
tion, that the federation is entitled to additional tax income in case the taxes listed in
article 73(XXIX) don’t cover federal expenditure. In reality almost all taxes are raised
and set at the federal level for administrative reasons. This leaves the states with reve-
nue that is too small even to finance the limited responsibilities that have been as-
signed to them. The constitution orders the federal government to share the proceeds
from the non-exclusive taxes with the state governments (article 73(XXIX)) but does not
explicitly prescribe how tax sharing practices should be designed.
The legal framework is laid down in the 1980 Law of Fiscal Coordination, in
which the states waive certain constitutional rights of taxation in exchange for a share
in federal tax collection. The law contains a formula, by which the funds will be distrib-
uted among the states, including the population size and historical shares. As each
transfer fund was overburdened by multiple objectives, the design of a stable sharing
formula proved to be a difficult task. This resulted in a “system of transfer that divides
funds based more on the bargaining power of legislators than on meeting the objec-
tives.”
48 There exist also discretionary transfers as a result of the so-called Convenios
Unicos de Desarrollo, which allocate funds among states after a series of bilateral ne-
gotiations between the federal government and the states’ planning committees.
49 All in
all the inauguration of the first opposition governors had made it more complicated to
twist the formulae and to distribute funds at least partly according to motives that are
not fully reflected in the objective sharing rule.
50
4.3.   Empirical Results
The OLS-regression results for the Mexican fiscal transfers in 1992 are docu-
mented in Table 3. As in the Argentinean regressions, all variables are standardized
with a mean of zero and a standard variation of unity. In equation M1 the dependent
variable is TRANSFER1986, the multiple of standard deviations from the mean of per
                                                                                                                               
47 An overview can be found in Planas (1993, pp. 97-99) and Gamboa González (1996, Section 3.3, Ap-
pendix I.4 and Table I.12). Arellano Cadena (1996, pp.123-131) is the best source for the evolution of
the sharing mechanisms used in Mexico.
48 Cf. Gamboa González (1996, p. 118).
49 Winkler (1994, p. 36) notes that “critics complain that politics can also play a large role in the allocation
of both the size and composition of the CUD, especially in election years.”
50 “Specific-purpose transfers lack transparent criteria and have often been mired in political controversy
and debate.” Shah (1994, S. 37). “La transparencia en la recaudación fiscal ha sido puesta en el debate
nacional por los primeros gobiernos estatales de oposición, los cuales declaran que existe una amplia
discrecionalidad política en la distribución de los recursos.” Alba Vega (1995, p. 100).27
capita transfers (participaciones) in 1986. A value of zero would hence indicate that a
state has received an amount of per capita transfers which is identical to the average
state’s per capita transfer income. Equations M2 through M5 repeat this exercise for
1992. The six-year difference is not coincidental: both years represent the same rela-
tive point in time during a presidential sexenio, the six year term of office. 1986 was half
way through De la Madrid’s term whereas 1992 falls into the middle of Salinas de Gor-
tari’s presidency. Another argument for the six-year time span is the fact that the equa-
tions will investigate the effect gubernatorial races had on spatial transfer patterns. As
the governors’ terms are also 6 years, exactly the same 16 state elections were held in
1986 and 1992, which ensures comparability of the two years.
From the distributional standpoint the results are truly surprising. HDI is a com-
posite development index comprising health, educational and income indicators. For
details on the definition consult appendix 1. Whereas in the Argentinean case the cor-
relation of the nationally standardized Human Development Index was not statistically
significant, the transfer system in Mexico seems to actually exacerbate regional differ-
ences in the level of development within the country. The secondary geographic inci-
dence is therefore likely to worsen due to the prevailing pattern of the transfer system.
While this unwelcome effect is not significant in 1986 (M1), the positive correlation in-
creases both in size and, considerably, in significance (>99% in M2). A deterioration in
the development level in 1992 of a state by one standard deviation will therefore lead
directly to a reduction of per capita transfers from central government of over a third of
a standard deviation, other things being equal.
51 This turn towards a more regressive
secondary distribution between 1986 and 1992 comes as a big surprise if it is taken
into account that the distribution formula has been changed in 1990. The reform com-
prised  a distribution of almost half of all shared taxes by population number in order to
promote the equity issue! Up to 1989 the distribution was arranged according to histori-
cal values and geographical origin of tax receipts, both favoring rich states.
52 The re-
form in the tax sharing formula determining secondary distribution did in reality not im-
prove interregional equity. On the contrary the gap between developed and underde-
veloped states widened further.
                                               
51 Similar results were found by Gamboa Gonzalez (1996, Table 13) using simple OLS regressions.
52 Cf. Arellano Cadena (1996, p. 130).28
On the positive side, the incentives for revenue subsidiarity have improved over
the years. The coefficient for TAXEFFORT – the standardized ratio of the state’s own
revenue (without federal transfers) relative to its GNP in the year preceding the ana-
lyzed period – was negligible in 1986. It became significantly positive in 1992 while at
the same time increasing in magnitude. Therefore, states which strive for higher own
revenue experience a “multiplier effect”, as they tend to receive higher participaciones
on top. Due to the importance of this revenue source the incentive effect may be strong
even if the elasticity is relatively modest in size (+0.16).
The state of Tabasco is the center of the Mexican oil industry and therefore re-
ceives per capita an exceptionally large amount of money from Mexico City. This is the
case because the distribution of shared taxes among states is still partly based on the
revenue each state collected in 1978, thereby benefiting states with rich tax bases, in
particular Tabasco as oil prices were exceptionally high in the late 1970s.
53 A dummy
variable, TABASCO, is introduced to control for its exceptional status. It is equal to 1 in
the case of Tabasco and zero otherwise. In all cases the TABASCO variable is positive,
large, and the most significant variable.
The remaining independent variables in equation M1 are political ones and go to
the core of this research. PRI85 is a standardized variable representing the PRI’s share
in the congressional elections in the summer of 1985 in each of the states. Equation
M1 shows that the relative strength of the ruling party did not make any difference in
the distribution of transfers from central government. However, the PRI central govern-
ment did not continue to behave like a non-partisan eunuch once it became harder to
ignore potential electoral threats. PRI88 is an indicator that is used to describes the
PRI’s sharply eroded strength at the 1988 presidential ballot (percentage of PRI sup-
port among valid cast votes). In 1992 PRI support of one standard deviation higher
than the national average resulted in augmented per capita transfers of about a fifth
standard deviation (significance = 97%). This testifies that transfers were allocated in a
                                               
53 Arellano Cadena (1996, Fn. 5) notes that this practice leads to injustices even within the group of oil
producing states. While Tabasco was producing 75% of Mexico’s oil in the base year (1978) relevant for
tax sharing, its share dropped to 24% by 1989 with Campeche taking over as main oil producer (70%).
The privileged status of Tabasco in intergovernmental fiscal transfers has been perpetuated despite this
drastic shift among oil producing states.29
way to favor states that remained loyal to the party during the crucial 1988 presidential
election.
This differs sharply from the Argentinean picture, where party politics played
no prominent role in allocating transfer payments. Whereas in Argentina the personal-
istic characteristics were the most decisive factors influencing the amount of federal
funding for the provinces’ budget, the Mexican practice took a more party oriented turn.
This striking contrast coincides with the general view that the Mexican system is con-
solidated by relying much more on stable institutions (including revolving party elites)
than the younger democracy of Argentina, where politics are centered around the
president’s personality and party affiliation fluctuates more widely.30
Table 3: Determinants of the regional distribution of federal transfers to
provincial governments in Mexico, 1992
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
        Dependent







HDI .20 .38 .37 .28 .29
(1.57) (3.76) (3.67) (2.35) (2.93)
TAXEFFORT .02 .16 .16 .11 .29
(.25) (1.87) (1.75) (1.17) (1.54)
SENADORES .27 .35 .34 .42 .42









ELECT -.34 -.25 -.23 -.39 -.29











COLIMA -.24 -.12 -.09 -.35 -.22
-(.52) -(.26) (-.19) (-.68) (-.43)
NUEVOLEON .05 -.44 -.44 -.17 -.28
(.09) (-.84) (-.82) (-.32) (-.51)
TABASCO 4.48 3.44 3.42 3.57 3.65
(10.04) (7.86) (7.68) (7.32) (8.11)
R2 adj. .79 .78 .77 .75 .76
F-Value 20.0 18.6 16.0 13.6 14.4
Sample size 31 31 31 31 31
Note: The values in parenthesis are t-statistics. The shaded coefficients are significant at a level of 90% or
more. All F-values are above the critical levels. For sources and definitions cf. appendix 1.31
The difference in political structures may also be responsible for the fact that the
respective presidents’ home states did not experience positive discrimination as the
province of La Rioja did in President Menem’s case. Neither De la Madrid’s home of
Colima, nor Nuevo León, from where the Salinas family originates, received any favor-
able treatment.
54 The variables COLIMA and NUEVOLEON are dummies for the two
states and play no role in determining the pattern of payments in any of the years.
Another indication of the strong party consciousness in Mexican politics could
possibly be found in the way the ruling party managed the transfers in the face of ap-
proaching elections of state governors. Until 1989, when the PAN won the governor-
ship in Baja California, all state governments were run by the PRI. As governors are
elected every six years, it was not until 1995 that an opposition party had to defend a
state won earlier. All state elections during the period studied were therefore dominated
by the PRI guarding their ruling position. The dates of governor elections are less con-
centrated in Mexico than they are in Argentina, where almost all provinces vote their
governors at the same time as they vote for president.
55 The intertemporal deconcen-
tration of subnational elections in the Mexican case allows for a differentiated analysis
of whether upcoming state elections increased the transfers from central government in
order to grant the governor more spending power on the campaign trail. This federal
largesse could be used  to effectively “buy” votes as the electorate perceives the in-
creased provision of public services as a signal of competence of the PRI’s ruling gov-
ernment.
                                               
54 While Carlos Salinas was born in Mexico City, his father was born in 1917 in Monterrey/Nuevo León. De
la Madrid was born in Colima/Colima. Cf. Camp (1982, p. 273 and 1993, p. 58).
55 In 1995 14 of the 24 governorships in Argentinean provinces were elected the same day as the presi-
dential election with 7 additional governor races later in the same year. Corrientes was the only province
where no governorship was up for election in 1995. Cf. Latin American Regional Reports-Southern Cone,
June 1, 1995, p.2. For details see the joint Website of El Clarin Newspaper and the University of Buenos
Aires at http://www.uba.ar/elec95.32
In order to detect any partisan abuse of transfers with the aim of supporting the
party’s local stalwarts defending their governorship, the dummy ELECT is introduced
which equals 1 if elections were held in late 1992 or early 1993 and zero otherwise.
56
Looking at the results of M1 and M2 it is surprising to find statistically significant
negative coefficients for ELECT. This indicates that if any influence of upcoming state
elections to the received flows of transfers was present, it was actually to the detriment
of exiting PRI governors. This suggests, that the central government did not rush to the
help of the local party militants trying to defend their terrain for the PRI, but rather hurt
the local PRI campaign by withdrawing transfers from the state government. This con-
clusion, which from the political economy viewpoint is somewhat counterintuitive, needs
some further explanation.
Equations M3 through M5 help to shed some light on this mystery. M3 differs
from M2 by including an interaction term (the product of two dummies).
ELECT*PRISTRONG is equal to one if there are governor elections and if the PRI is
strong in that state (i.e. the PRI’s share in the total valid vote in the 1988 presidential
election was at least a two thirds majority). This “double-dummy“ can be used to deter-
mine, whether or not there is a change in the functional relation between per capita
transfers and the fact of upcoming elections, when the relative electoral standing of the
PRI varies. In particular, it tells us whether the counterintuitive allocation in election
years goes away if we differentiate between states where the PRI is strong (and there-
fore does not need an extra fiscal boost) and where it is weak (and where withdrawing
funds could be really harmful for the PRI in electoral terms).  The result in equation M3
seems to be negative: nothing changes in terms of sign, size, or significance of the co-
efficients, when we separate PRI strongholds from states with a more shaky majority.
Things look different, however, if the same statistical procedure is repeated re-
placing the PRI with the main “right wing” opposition party (PAN). The results are re-
ported in equation M4. The negative sign on PAN88 (the share of the PAN’s presiden-
                                               
56 Strictly speaking the dummy equals 1 whenever a governor election fell into the second half of 1992 or
the first half of 1993. This procedure is chosen, as the focus is on the question, whether the geographi-
cal distribution of federal funds had been redirected in order to allow additional state spending before
elections. If an election had been in the first half of 1992, the transfers of 1992 would probably have ar-
rived too late to be electorally exploitable. Therefore the period January through June 1992 is omitted.33
tial candidate in 1988) was of course expected, as we found a significant positive sign
on PRI88 in M1 and M2 and since PRI88 and PAN88 are negatively correlated (corre-
lation coefficient = –0.27). The surprising result, however, lies in the negative signifi-
cance of the ELECT dummy with the interaction term  ELECT*PANSTRONG  being
positive at the same time, at a significance level of 83%.
57 What is the story which the
coefficients in equation M4 can tell us? It tells us that, while upcoming elections did in
general reduce the per capita transfers received (ELECT=–0.39), they do rise, when
those elections take place in a PAN stronghold (ELECT*PANSTRONG=+0.56). Since
this increase takes place before the background of generally lower receipts in states
where the PAN is strong (PAN88=-0.13), the ruling PRI governors in PAN strongholds
experience pronounced cyclicality of their fiscal accounts. This budget cycle is syn-
chronized with the electoral calendar: while in “normal” years, they receive less trans-
fers than the average state (PAN88<0), they receive  much more in election years
(ELECT*PANSTRONG>0).
This electoral cycle introduces additional volatility to state finances with the aim
of improving the short term economic conditions in the state and luring voters away
from the PAN. If this pattern comes in addition to generally higher pre-electoral state
spending that is likely to prevail independently, fiscal volatility is worsened by the cen-
tral government’s regional allocation of transfers.
It is interesting to note, that a similar budget cycle is not observable in the
states, where the more radical opposition (PRD) was strong.
58 While the “punishment”
of PRD states was detectable with a probability of at least 90% (PRD88 = –0.18) there
was no “pardon” in the case of elections upcoming in PRD strongholds
(ELECT*PRDSTRONG insignificant and low). This is surprising, because the correla-
tion between PRI- and PRD-shares in the 1988 election is much more pronounced (-
                                                                                                                               
For analogous reasons the first half of 1993 is included in the time range for elections that could be in-
fluenced by the transfers granted in 1992.
57 PANSTRONG equals 1 whenever the PAN’s share in the total valid vote in the 1988 presidential election
was at least 10% higher than the non-weighted interstate mean of the PAN’s share (15.8%) and zero
otherwise. Six states were PAN strongholds using this definition. Among those six there were governor
elections between July 1992 and June 1993 in Aguascalientes, Chihuahua and Sinaloa.
58 PRDSTRONG equals 1 whenever the share in the total valid vote in favor of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in
the 1988 presidential election was at least 10% higher than the non-weighted interstate mean of Cárde-
nas’ share (25.1%) and zero otherwise. Seven states were PAN strongholds using this definition. Among
those seven there were governor elections between July 1992 and June 1993 in Michoacán and Guer-
rero.34
0.75) than the one between PRI- and PAN-shares (-0.27). It would therefore not have
been surprising if the PRI had perceived the PRD as being  more directly threatening
than the PAN. Apparently this was not the case, as no similar cyclical behavior could be
observed in PRD strongholds. Part of the explanation may be, that the PRD may have
been perceived as not posing the same electoral threat as the PAN, which had already
proved that it can win governorships. The PRD, by contrast, had lost some of its politi-
cal following after 1988. Since many supporters of the PRD were concentrated in the
Federal District, where for constitutional reasons no local elections were held, these
opposition followers were electorally impotent and could easily be ignored by the PRI at
gubernatorial races.
59
In addition, the equations analyze whether Mexico – like Argentina – experi-
enced an allocation biased in favor of the states that are over-represented in congress.
SENADORES is defined exactly as in the Argentinean context. Hence, a positive value
indicates that the state is over-represented. The “elasticity” of per capita transfers with
respect to  senatorial  overrepresentation is significant, positive around one third, in-
creasing somewhat between the De la Madrid and the Salinas presidencies. In the light
of the described powerlessness of Mexican legislators an alternative explanation is
plausible that does not rely on effective lobbying of autonomous lawmakers. In both
periods the PRI was defending its hegemonic position within the Mexican party spec-
trum, fending off inherent regime change. This was of course more obvious in 1992,
but even in 1986 the opposition threat was evident. The PAN is claiming to have won
the Sonora and Chihuahua governorships in 1985 and 1986 with only electoral fraud
                                               
59 There is another explanation to the different responses to electoral threat from the left and the right,
which draws on the socioeconomic differences of the respective supporters. PAN voters are recruited
from the middle to upper classes such as businessmen that benefit stronger from the services provided
by the state governments (infrastructure, tax reductions...) as do poorer segments of the population. As
PRD voters are either poor or left leaning intellectuals they value the states’ services less highly but at-
tach higher importance to social services – not typically provided by state governments. Therefore addi-
tional spending by PRI governors in PRD-bulwarks would not be very effective in attracting oppositional
votes.
In related research I show that before elections the federal government’s anti poverty program “Solidari-
dad” did channel its funds exactly into these left leaning states while “PAN-states” were neglected (other
things such as level of development being equal. Cf. Kraemer, 1997). The picture is an almost exact re-
versal from the spatial allocation pattern of transfers. This suggests that the PRI followed a flexible
strategy in fighting back at the opposition, always using the policy instrument that is more productive in
“buying” electoral support.35
having kept it from assuming power.
60 In such an environment the PRI probably tried to
avoid any electoral loss, as each lost Senator or governor would signify an unheard of
precedence. The signal of losing a governor, for example, is equally destructive for the
PRI, whether it happens in a small state or in a very populous one. A loss would be like
a binary signal signifying that the PRI is vulnerable and actually can lose elections.
Maintaining dominion therefore calls for minimizing the probability that this signal will
occur. In order to prevent this regime-destabilizing event from surfacing it is rational for
the PRI leadership to scatter given resources primarily among population-poor states.
This strategy maximizes the number of states that can be “bought” with the money at
hand. As coincidentally small states are over-represented in the Senate, this party
based hypothesis may explain the significantly positive SENADORES variable despite
the weakness of lawmakers, which in addition don’t have an incentive to fight for their
region, as they are constitutionally prohibited to seek reelection. The distribution of
funds would in this scenario be “supply-leading” rather than “demand-following”.
61
4.4.   Conclusions
n  The equity principle has been violated in Mexico both in its weak and its strong
formulation in 1992. Less developed states received systematically less per capita
transfers than richer ones. In 1986 the evidence is not hard enough to make any
judgment on the progressiveness. The special case of Tabasco, which is a rich
                                               
60 Craig/Cornelius (1991, Table 3) report that the whereas the PRI held in 70% of the 300 federal electoral
districts a hegemonic or monopolistic position (defined as holding at least a 25% points lead before the
second party in the district), this proportion had fallen to 54% in 1985 before collapsing to a mere 35%
in 1988.
61 The number of deputies in the lower chamber is roughly proportional to the represented population.
While to some extent over- and under-representation exists also in the lower house, this phenomenon
does not correlate with population size. Running the reported regressions with a analogously defined
variable DIPUTADOS instead of SENADORES, explanatory power of the equations goes down (R² adj.
falls around 10%) and DIPUTADOS remains insignificant. This fact is supporting the hypothesis that it
was not so much the politically weak senators of over-represented states that lobbied for regional sup-
port, but a rational PRI leadership fighting against the collapse of a crumbling one-party system. If leg-
islators were successful in supporting their constituencies, a significant positive coefficient would have to
elapse for DIPUTADOS also, even if the representation intensity does depend on other variables than
population size.
It should also be noted that 40% of the deputies are not directly elected in their districts, but enter con-
gress through multi-state party lists. They therefore don’t have an incentive to lobby for the prosperity of
their home state as they are not accountable to the population of any one state. However, these 200
party candidates typically belong to opposition parties and have for that reason no real influence on pol-
icy making, anyway. On the other hand, most of the 300 directly elected and thus district-based repre-
sentatives are PRI-members.36
state and constantly received by far the most per capita transfers, stands also in
stark contrast to the proposition.
n  The incentive principle in its weak interpretation has been satisfied in both 1986
and 1992. Increased tax effort by states was not punished by a withdrawal of
transfers.
n  The political nondiscrimination principle has been violated in Mexico in several
ways:
1.  There are indications that the fiscal transfer system was used by the Mexican gov-
ernment in order to promote the ruling parties electoral perspectives. States loyal to
the PRI received, ceteris paribus, more per capita funds than the opposition strong-
holds.
2.  In gubernatorial election years the states with a strong PAN following received a
substantial premium. This added electorally motivated volatility to the states’ fi-
nances renders the process of expenditure-smoothing more difficult.
3.  Population-poor states (that are also over-represented in the Senate) received more
funds per capita. Possibly the PRI tried to maintain its political quasi-monopoly as
long as possible. The number of electoral defeats play an important role in such a
situation. By concentrating transfers on less populous states this number can be
minimized.
4.  In stark contrast to the Argentinean experience in the mid-1990s, the Mexican
president did not seem to have influenced the pattern of transfer payments in order
to benefit the state where his own family has its roots.
5.      BRAZIL
5.1.   The political institutions
Politically, Brazil differs sharply from both Argentina and Mexico by struggling
with an extremely dispersed and unstable party system. Popular support for different
parties fluctuate erratically, new parties spring up and formerly established parties fall
into oblivion. Discussing the 1989 presidential elections, Schneider states that „what
most distinguished the Brazilian electorate in 1989 was inexperience in voting to fill na-37
tional offices and very weak ties to political parties.“
62 Parties do not represent a par-
ticular ideology but often serve primarily as a platform for ambitious individual politi-
cians. In the face of only loosely organized and largely powerless parties a particular
politician’s restrictions on serving her or his clienteles are much less binding. Ideological
cohesion and party discipline are extremely low among the fairly autonomous legisla-
tors in both houses of Congress.
63 Regional clientelistic motivations tend to take the
front seat whenever it comes to legislative voting.
64 State interests in nominating con-
gressional candidates clearly dominate recommendations from national party head-
quarters.
65 Whenever it seems beneficial to do so a representative in either house can
change parties at will in the middle of the legislative term with absolute impunity.
66 This
makes Brazil the opposite case of Mexico, where – until very recently – the party lead-
ership determined loyal candidates without much local “interference”.
As a consequence of the described political landscape, political fault lines in the
legislative bodies run predominantly along regional interests rather than party organiza-
tion. Otherwise it would be hard to conceive how a president like Collor could have
governed with his party occupying only 6% of the seats in the Senate and 8% in the
Deputies’ Chamber.
67 It also makes log-rolling a more important issue for legislative ini-
tiatives originating in the executive branch, as the president cannot rely on his party
alone for securing a majority, even if he were to succeeded in disciplining its legislators.
The „balkanization“ of the party system can also be pinned down below the federal
level: after the gubernatorial elections in late 1990 the 27 states (including the Federal
District) were ruled by governors belonging to 11 different parties!
68
                                               
62 Schneider (1996, p. 111). Mainwaring (1990, Table 3) reports that about 2/3 of Brazilian voters could not
report any party preference in a 1988 poll.
63 Mainwaring (1990, Table 6).
64 Cf. Ames (1995) for an excellent analysis of the relationship between the prevailing electoral system and
the outcomes in terms of voting behavior of legislators. „Brazil has always been a country of extraordi-
narily weak institutions and, occasionally at least, strong political personalities. … among the weakest
and most ephemeral have been political parties, with the possible recent exception of the Worker’s Party
(PT).“ Zirkler (1995, p.89).
65 Cf. Ames (1996, p.7).
66 Cf. Ames (1996, Footnote 18), Mainwaring (1990, p.11-12). The Economist (Nov. 9, 1996) reports that a
third of all representatives did change parties in the last legislative session, several more than once, one
of them switching even 7 times!
67 For time series in seat distributions cf. Nohlen (1993, p.159-162).
68 Cf. Wilkie/Contreras (1992, p. 282, Table 1032).38
In this institutional context the engineering of a majority in Congress for a certain
fiscal policy relies heavily on flexibly amending the original budget plan.
69 The most im-
portant institution through which the regional interests of lawmakers are articulated is
the bicameral budget committee. This committee is particularly large with over 60
members that made not less than 12,000 budget amendments in 1990 alone! The
committee has in the past widely been regarded as having served as a mere mecha-
nism to provide benefits for the committee members’ constituencies. During the chair-
manship of longtime congressman João Alves from the state of Bahia in 1990-91 he
made sure that the bulk of pork barrel was flowing into the pockets of his own cronies
and followers. This continued until an “upsurge” in the committee unseated him and
guaranteed a regionally more egalitarian distribution.
In order to investigate the political determinants of the regional transfer distribu-
tion it is therefore appropriate not to concentrate on differentials in the relative strength
of the pretty meaningless parties but on the regional domination patterns in Congress
and the Budget Committee.
5.2.   Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
The prominence of discretionarily negotiated "convenios” between the federal
and the states’ governments throws the door wide open for political bargaining behind
the scenes.
70 This regional interest-clearing is at least highly probable for the negoti-
ated convenios. The discretionary convenios represented about a fifth of total transfers
in the early 1990s.
71 They are based on “ad hoc decisions and devoid of any formal
criteria”
72 Over 3000 of these convenios existed in 1988 alone, accounting for almost
half of the transfers not mandated by constitutional tax sharing imperatives. The con-
venios objectives are numerous. In general they are designed to transfer funds to lower
echelons of governments undertaking expenditures on behalf of the federal govern-
ment. Almost all of the transfers go to state governments with transfers to municipalities
being a rare exception.
73 A World Bank publication suspected political exploitation of
                                               
69 For the following paragraph cf. Ames (1996, p. 28-31)
70 Cf. Bomfim/Shah (1991, p. 8). For an overview of the multitude of different transfers cf. Shah (1990,
sections 2.1 through 2.3).
71 Cf. Shome (1995, p. 17-18).
72 Shah (1990, p. 41 and 48, cf. P. 47-50 for a description of the most important types of convenios).
73 Cf. Shah (1990, p. 40-41).39
the convenios noting that “the state of Maranhão, then-President Sarney’s home state
had a very peculiar participation in the overall distribution of negotiated transfers
[...receiving] higher funding [...] than all the state governments in the northern region as
a whole.”
74
Even if the formal revenue sharing mechanisms were to work fully according to
the established rules and without political interference by either the administration or
Congress, appendix 2 indicates that transfers stemming from pure tax sharing mecha-
nisms (on average US$ 183 p.c.) were accounting for less than half of the total pay-
ments to lower echelons of government in 1991 (US$ 395 p.c.). The larger part of verti-
cal payments were therefore transfer from non-tax-sharing sources that indeed proved
to be more regionally volatile as the tax sharing component of the vertical transfers
(variation coefficient of 2.4 versus 1.1). Besides, it should be noted that even the for-
mulas applied for constitutional tax sharing have been subject to political renegotiation
in the states’ Council of Finance Ministers. The renegotiated share in 1990-91 differed
substantially from the result that had been obtained by applying the formulae, with
some of the states giving up over a third of their calculated receipts (in the case of São
Paulo 75%, Rio de Janeiro 64%), while others received about a third more than the
formulae would suggest.
75
5.3.   Empirical Results
In the following we investigate the regional variances of per capita transfers in
the year of 1991. This year is chosen as president Fernando Collor de Mello was al-
ready established in the executive branch  and at the peak of power and popularity
before the corruption allegations led to his impeachment. 1991 is therefore clearly not a
year that has been dominated by a political transition, but can be considered as a
„normal” year, although “normal” years didn’t seem to occur very often in Brazil until re-
cently. The equations include both political and nonpolitical variables explaining the de-
pendent variable TOTALTRANSFER, which is the standardized amount of transferred
US-Dollars per capita in 1991 (equation B1). Equations B2 and B3 break the total of
1991 down into more rigid transfers from constitutionally mandated tax sharing mecha-
                                               
74 Shah (1990, p. 41-47 and Table 15 on p. 42).
75 Cf. Shah (1990, Table 13 and p. 32 and 66).40
nisms (TAXTRANSFER) and the more flexible transfers from other agreements (NON-
TAXTRANSFER).
The nonpolitical variables include TAXEFFORT, which is the standardized ra-
tio of the states’ own revenue (excluding the transfers from central government) and
their respective GNP. In addition, PCY (the per capita income in 1985)
76, and
SQRTDENSITY (the square root of the population density) have both been considered
for use in the equations. Both indicators are explicitly used in the Funds that transfer
resources to the states for redistributive purposes.
77  But due to the high correlation
between PCY and SQRTDENSITY (correlation coefficient = 0.69) they were not applied
simultaneously. As the results remain virtually unchanged whether one or the other of
the variables is used only the results for PCY are reported here, always bearing in mind
that the density variable would generate equivalent outcomes. PCY is preferred relative
to SQRTDENSITY because of the lower correlation with the other independent vari-
ables.
78
The political variables do not comprise party variables as justified above. In or-
der to isolate the wide differences of representation of states in the Brazilian Congress
we use the variable SENADORES, which is defined as the number Senators per million
voters. As the data in appendix 2 shows impressively the representation is very une-
qual between states: whereas the state of São Paulo can send only 0.16 Senators per
million voters the number for Roraima is 41, i.e. 250 times as many! While the bias
against the more populous states is slightly less dramatic in the lower chamber the ex-
treme inequality in representation intensity remains.
79 With Brazilian lawmakers not ef-
fectively restricted by party discipline when promoting their clientelistic and regionalist
interests, the considerable inequality in relative representation could lead to increased
per capita transfers to the over-represented states. In this case SENADORES will carry
                                               
76 Data availability did not allow for the use of the HDI as in the cases of Argentina and Mexico.
77 Cf. Shome (1995, p. 18).
78 An alternative indicator for the relative cost per capita of public service provision, the degree of urbani-
zation, is even more correlated with PCY (0.81) and therefore rejected.
79 The correlation coefficient between senators and deputies per million voters is +0.997. Whereas espe-
cially the larger states are better represented in the lower chamber, this does not change the over-
whelming pattern of the more intensive representation of less populous states. Data for the absolute
number of deputies per state refers to the 50th congress (1995-1999) and comes from Camara de
Deputados (1995, p. 929-933).41
a positive sign. If congressional politics play no role at all, SENADORES should be in-
distiguishable from zero.
BAHIA is a dummy variable equal to one in the case of Bahia and zero other-
wise. If the then-chairman of the budget committee, João Alves, had been as success-
ful in assuring favorable transfers for his home state of Bahia as he is said to have
been in amending the budget, BAHIA would bear a positive sign. An additional dummy
variable of President Collor's home state, ALAGOAS, is included in the equations.
SÃOPAULO is a third regional dummy variable that is to control for any „metropolis-
bias” in favor of the most populous and the politically and economically by far most in-
fluential state (in absolute terms).
80
The standardized dependent variable of equation B1 in Table 4 below is TO-
TALTRANSFER, the total transfer received per voter by the 27 Brazilian states in 1991
in current US$. There is a perverse effect indicating that better-off states received ce-
teris paribus higher transfers. However, while significantly positive at the 99% level, the
relatively small size of the PCY-coefficient (+0.16) attests a regressive pattern of a rela-
tively milder sort than in Mexico (where the HDI-variable was used): an increase in one
standard deviation in per capita income will lead to an increase in total transfers per
voter of “only“ a sixth standard deviation. However, the postulate of redistribution to-
wards economically weaker states has been significantly violated as the richer states
receive relatively more per capita funding (coefficient > 0). If the total of transfers are
broken down into a tax- and a non-tax part it is interesting to note that the perverse
distributional pattern exists only for the more discretionary non-tax part (equation B3)
with a highly significant “elasticity“ of +0.27. By contrast, the formula-based transfers
per voter that stem from tax-sharing arrangements seem to be negatively dependent
from per capita incomes (equation B2), although the T-value of -1.46 indicates a low
significance level of only 84%. Keeping this caveat in mind it is striking that only the
more discretionary part of transfers (i.e. from non-tax sharing sources) had the unde-
sired distributional impact of favoring economically advanced states. This effect was
pronounced enough to display a positive relationship between income and transfer of a
state even on the aggregate level (equation B1). Thus a somewhat casual observation
in a World Bank publication that the negotiated transfers seem to reverse the equity42
objectives in the formulae-based tax-sharing arrangements is supported by the empiri-
cal evidence.
81
TAXEFFORT shows no significant coefficients in any of the three equations. It
can therefore be postulated that the prevailing transfer system did not create any in-
centives in favor of enhanced own revenue collection on the state level (positive sign)
but did also avoid moral hazard problems (negative sign).
Table 4: Determinants of the Regional Distribution of Federal Transfers per
Registered Voter to State Governments in Brazil, 1991
B1 B2 B3
          Dependent











































R² adj. .90 .76 .86
F-Value 84.4 19.4 41.3
Sample Size 27 27 27
Note: The values in parentheses are t-statistics. The shaded coefficient are significant at a level of 90% or
more. All F-values are above the critical values. For sources and definitions cf. appendix 1.
What are the results of the „political” variables introduced above? There is no
evidence that the president or the chairman of the budget committee worked in order to
                                                                                                                               
80 Cf. Shah (1990, p. 47).
81 Cf. Shah (1990, p. 47).43
favor their home bases of Alagoas and Bahia respectively.
82 Similarly insignificant re-
sults are reported for the dummy applying in the case of the state of São Paulo. No
“metropolis-bias” could be detected.
The most striking result of the Brazilian equations, however, are the large and
significant coefficients of the SENADORES variable. Indeed, the unadjusted R² falls
barely from 0.96 only to 0.94 when all other independent variables are omitted in B1,
whereas the adjusted R² remains virtually unchanged! The information incorporated in
additional variables is thus exactly outweighed by their statistical cost in terms of de-
creasing degrees of freedom. The „elasticity” hovers around unity, being larger in the
case of discretionary transfers (equation B3). One result emerges unambiguously: the
intensity of representation in the Senate is the driving force determining the distribution
of federal transfers to the states. Surprisingly, this is also true for the „rules-based” tax
sharing transfers, indicating either a bias in the formulae originating in congressional
log-rolling or a non-adherence to the established formulae or a combination of both of
the above. The Senators have clearly been zealous and potent enough to control the
pattern of transfers favoring their own constituencies. As the distribution of Senators
(and also of Representatives) is highly biased to the detriment of the more populous
states, the net effect of this political power-play has been an equally skewed distribu-
tion of funds. Figure 2 shows the plain relationship between political representation of a
state and the transfers received.
Is the congressional domination of the transfer distribution is a mere statistical
aberration because the over-represented states tend to have a lower population densi-
ties and therefore higher costs of providing public services, which in turn calls for higher
per capita transfers for equity reasons? Unfortunately not. While it is true that there ex-
ists a negative relationship between SQRTDENSITY and SENADORES (-0.35) this is
not suggesting that either sign or significance of the SENADORES coefficients are ac-
tually representing characteristics of density differentials. Running the equations with
the SQRTDENSITY variable instead of PCY (remember the high correlation of 0.69
                                               
82 Schneider (1996, p. 114) asserts that while „portrayed as a ‘northeasterner’ largely on the basis of tours
of duty as mayor of Maceió (1979-1982) and governor of Alagoas (1987-1989), Collor was more a prod-
uct of Brazil’s heartland, his home for most of his life.” That Collor was educated, among others, in Rio
de Janeiro and Brasilia may partly explain why the ALAGOAS variable did not show the same relevance
than LARIOJA in the case of Argentina.44
between the two), the absolute and T-values of the SENADORES coefficients hardly
change, whereas SQRTDENSITY performs somewhat “worse” in terms of size and sig-
nificance of the coefficient as did PCY.
Figure 2:
Parliamentary Representation and Intergovernmental Transfers, Brazil
5.4.   Conclusion
n  The equity principle was violated in the year examined (1991). States with higher
per capita income received, ceteris paribus, higher per capita transfers. This is due
to the significantly progressive distribution of transfers from non-tax sources.
n  The incentive principle was violated in the strong, but adhered to using the weak
interpretation. The tax effort of states played no role in determining the secondary
distribution. While higher tax efforts on subnational level were not encouraged, they
were at least not influenced negatively either.
n  The political nondiscrimination principle was violated. The political representa-
tion variable clearly prevails as the most important influence in both the Brazilian
transfer system. In a democracy a fair representation of each segment of the
population therefore seems to be a precondition for achieving a politically unbiased
distribution of fiscal resources.45
6.     CONCLUSIONS
Ahrens stresses the point "that the political institutions play a major part for de-
termining the design, functioning and effects of a federal system.“
83 This claim is sup-
ported by the findings of this research. This paper has attempted to isolate political
factors behind the regional distribution of transfers from central government to lower
administrative units that may be unavoidable in federal nations when efficient tax and
responsibility assignments prevail. Political institutions have proved to be of equal or
even higher importance as economic and socio-demographic factors in Argentina, Bra-
zil and Mexico.
84
Serious questions are raised by these findings concerning good governance
problems. It appears that a well functioning political system with fine tuned checks and
balances between the constitutional powers is as important as the reduction of discre-
tionary power by the central government. Recent research on the effect of budgetary
institutions on fiscal outcomes in Latin America has come to the conclusion, that a re-
duction in the discretionary power in budgetary procedures leads to lower primary defi-
cits and more stable macroeconomic outcomes.
85 But can a similar conclusion be
drawn for the issue of intergovernmental relations or is skepticism called for?
While strict adherence to binding legal rules may indeed be a necessary condi-
tion for less distortionary fiscal policies and less partisan abuse of public funds, this re-
search suggests that it is hardly a sufficient one. The improvement of budgetary proce-
dures should optimally be complemented by reform of the political institutions where
needed. The shortcomings of some democratic systems of present day Latin America
will lead to biased results even if strict adherence to the law were guaranteed.
                                               
83Ahrens (1996, p. 20).
84 The fact that representation matters is not confined to developing countries, however. Analyzing the
1995 net contribution of  14 EU member states to the union’s budget (excluding the exceptional case of
tiny Luxemburg) it can be shown that a higher number of national votes in the EU’s Council of Ministers
per citizen leads to a significant reduction in the net contribution after correcting for different per capita
incomes. If all variables are standardized with a zero mean and unity standard deviation, the estimate is
as follows: NET CONTRIBUTION = +0.62 PER CAPITA INCOME  -0.44 COUNCILVOTES PER CITI-
ZEN. (R² adj.= 0.5889, both coefficients are significant at more than 98% and the coefficient of correla-
tion of the two explanatory variables is -0.2067. Data Sources: The Economist (Nov. 12, 1996, p. 57 and
Feb.1, 1997, p. 54).
85 Cf. Alesina/Hausmann/Hommes/Stein (1995).46
An example may underline the mutual reinforcement of binding rules and truly
democratic political representation. Although Argentina introduced tougher rules con-
cerning budget amendments in the early 1990s
86, the dominant impact of the skewed
regional representation in Congress has not changed. While the reforms may have
clamped down successfully on the increase of the fiscal deficits that used to be driven
by a multitude of amendments, they were certainly not successful in moving fiscal rela-
tions with the provinces towards distributional justice or rationality. Nor do they seem to
have effectively held the president’s discretionary power in check. The allocation of re-
sources that is unjustifiable within the normative framework presented in this paper
continues on a smaller fiscal scale. The unfair regional incidence has survived the re-
forms because it is founded on non-representative political representation that ridicules
the democratic principle of „one (wo)man one vote“, because the weight of an individual
vote cast is determined by the regional background of the voter. The power structure in
the legislation and the concentration of power in the presidency effectively hinder a re-
organization of intergovernmental fiscal relations despite stabilizing reforms of budget
institutions.
As a result a more radical stance towards the introduction of truly democratic
political institutions should be taken that reduces the impact of regional clientelism or
the de facto monopolization of power in the executive. This would not only lead to fairer
and more accountable policies by the public sector but would also help to keep down
the growing frustration and cynicism towards the political institution prevailing in the re-
gion. Failure to react swiftly with institutional reform comes close to risking a political
backlash that might effectively put at risk the democratic achievements of the early
1980s, of which the region used to be justly proud of.
                                               
86 Cf. Alesina/Hausmann/Hommes/Stein (1995, Appendix B, Question 3).47